The broadband debate: A documentary research on the broadband policy in Australia by Li, Grace
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Li, Grace
Conference Paper
The broadband debate: A documentary
research on the broadband policy in
Australia
8th International Telecommunications Society (ITS) Asia-Pacific Regional Conference,
Taiwan, 26 - 28 June, 2011: Convergence in the Digital Age
Provided in cooperation with:
International Telecommunications Society (ITS)
Suggested citation: Li, Grace (2011) : The broadband debate: A documentary research on the
broadband policy in Australia, 8th International Telecommunications Society (ITS) Asia-Pacific
Regional Conference, Taiwan, 26 - 28 June, 2011: Convergence in the Digital Age, http://
hdl.handle.net/10419/52344The Broadband Debate:  A Documentary Research on the 
Broadband Policy in Australia 
	 ﾠ
Grace	 ﾠLi	 ﾠ
Faculty	 ﾠof	 ﾠLaw	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
University	 ﾠof	 ﾠTechnology,	 ﾠSydney	 ﾠ(UTS)	 ﾠ
Australia	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Abstract 
 
Against a current trend of investing in the next generation networks (NGNs) by using 
public funds, the Australian government has recently initiated a so-called National 
Broadband  Networks  (NBN)  project  to  invest  up  to  AUD$36  billion  tax  payer’s 
money on building a national wide fibre broadband network aiming to cover 93 per 
cent Australian by 2020. As being the most costly infrastructure-building project in 
Australian  history,  the  NBN  project  will  use  a  public-private-partnership  as  the 
instrument  to  deliver  super-fast  broadband  services,  create  jobs  and  promote  the 
country’s economy at large. This article will critically analyse the NBN project in 
Australia and highlight the challenges that are coming alone at this early stage of the 
deployment, so the Australia’s experience of pubic investment in broadband networks 
can be shared and lessons can be learned.   
1  Introduction     
 
It  has  been  widely  accepted  in  recent  years  that  the  impact  of  high-speed 
Internet access on the economy and society is vital. For this reason, investment in 
next  generation  networks  has  been  receiving  extraordinary  attentions  from  policy 
makers all over the world. Many governments have started considering broadband 
availability and affordability as an objective of social cohesion, and in fact, many of 
them released action plans.  
The  analysis  of  these  policies  has  demonstrated  a  wide  range  of  public 
measures to promote NGNs deployment, which created a number of different choices 
for policy makers. Countries are now deciding on which measure (or measures) would 
serve the best of the social and economical goals of their nation. During this process, 
some countries with effective and strong regulatory policies are forging ahead with a 
lively fibre footprint. Many European countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands 
provided  such  examples.  Those  policies  aim  to  encourage  investing  in  fibre 
infrastructure  while  promoting  competition.  During  the  same  process,  there  are 
counties  considering  a  better  use  of  wireless  technology  and  so  to  avoid  the 
significant capital input of fibre broadband deployment. On this point, the recently 
White House decision titled ‘National Wireless Initiative ’ (The White House, 2011) 
on 10
th Feb 2011 indicated the policy change of the US government from a national 
wide fibre broadband plan to the current plan of promoting a comprehensive national 
wireless coverage, which is expected to be done with a much lower cost.  
Nevertheless, the world has witnessed some new trends in the recent years on 
NGNs policy with a distinctive feature of combining heavy public investments and active  government  participations.  Countries  such  as  Australia,  New  Zealand  and 
Singapore made such examples.  
Countries have different agenda in deciding their broadband policy. There are 
therefore various motives for public investment in telecommunications at national, 
regional or municipal level. Cave and Martin have summarised three main motives as 
being – one, social motive to achieve equity; two, industry motive to construct high 
speed networks as an instrument for the provision of a faster broadband used both in 
production and in consumption; and three, an economic motive to reduce the deficit 
take over suffered in the recent economic downturn (Cove & Martin, 2010). Same 
study further established the drive for setting up a public private joint investment 
model in telecommunications infrastructure deployment. The authors highlighted the 
role of the government, stating “accelerate the spread of next generation broadband 
is a task requiring massive investments—on a scale that will normally be beyond the 
scope of public funding and accordingly, such investments should be planned within 
the framework of a public/private partnership (PPP) in which the government plays a 
coordinating and a partial financing role; the latter being designed to crowd in rather 
than crowd out public investment”(Cove & Martin, 2010). 
On  this  point,  the  recent  National  Broadband  Network  (NBN)  Policy  in 
Australia presented an interesting case with active participation from the Australian 
National government in the deployment of a nation wide fibre broadband network. A 
much business-like government entity was also formed to carry out this significant 
mission.  
An overall focus of this paper is to study the Australia’s NBN policy with an 
aim to highlight the challenges associated with this policy making. Part two of this 
paper  provides  a  literature  background  concerning  government  intervention  in 
broadband infrastructure. Part three examines the Australia’s NBN project in detail 
and highlights four key challenges associated at this early stage of deployment. Part 
four contains conclusions.  
2  A new paradigm of Next Generation Networks policy 
 
The diverse investment structure in high-speed broadband networks has been 
driven by a variety of market and non-market factors in the recent time. Countries like 
Japan  and  Korea  have  taken  the  lead  in  orchestrating  the  high-speed  broadband 
initiatives in their region, while other countries are either carefully planning their 
broadband strategies or concentrating on the infrastructure upgrades to promote the 
building of the information society (Falch & Henten, 2010; OECD, 2010).  A core of 
this process is a profound focus on extending or constructing the NGN infrastructure 
that  is  always  associated  with  significant  capital  input.  As  a  result,  the  issue  of 
infrastructure  investment  has  come  increasingly  higher  up  on  the  agenda  of 
governments culminating with policy initiatives in a range of countries. No matter 
what  stages  that  countries  are  current  perusing  in  this  undertaking,  making  the 
investment decision is inevitably the most important part. 
 
2.1  The re-appearance of public involvement in telecommunications  
 
Tracing  back  the  development  of  the  industry,  investing  in 
telecommunications  has  always  been  an  issue  heavily  influenced  by  political  and 
economical considerations.  The industry started with a so-called ‘nature monopoly’ status, that covered 
several decades from the beginning of network deployment, and particularly from the 
end  of  the  Second  World  War,  up  to  the  various  crises  in  the  seventies. 
Telecommunications were seen as a ‘public matter’ during this period. The service 
was  normally  provided  by  a  public  operator  or  a  public  company  in  most  of  the 
countries in the world (J.L. Go ́mez-Barroso & C. Feijo ́o., 2010). In many cases, 
regulatory functions were carried out by the administrative authority on which the 
monopolists depended.   
The  nature  monopoly  period  was  followed  by  the  liberalisation  stage 
commenced from the late seventies and early eighties, which was driven by a variety 
of  factors  (Feijo  ́o.,  2006).  A  common  phenomenon  in  this  process  involved 
privatisation  of  the  monopolist,  progressive  liberalisation  of  the  industry  and  the 
market as well as making changes of regulatory regimes. Private firms started to take 
control of the market and the industry development gradually became an issue rely 
largely upon the private sector except few key infrastructures concerning national 
securities. In regard to the equality concern that was present during the entire period, 
many countries developed various policies such as the universal service obligation to 
address ‘residual’ problems on the supply side (J.L. Go ́mez-Barroso & C. Feijo ́o., 
2010).  
The  liberalisation  and  privatisation  stage  quickly  resulted  in  some f a s t  
developments of the industry in many parts of the world, just as promised by the 
widely accepted market economy theories. Studies were also carried out to test the 
inter-relationship between the fast development and the liberalisation, many of which 
came up with positive findings. For example, Li and Xu (Yu Liangchuan, 2004) use a 
large set of 177 countries over the period 1990–2001 to investigate the impact of 
privatisation and competition on telecommunication with ITU and World Bank data. 
They  find  positive  effects  of  privatisation  on  output,  productivity  and  resource 
allocation although their estimates show that full privatisation increases both output 
and prices of telecommunications services. 
Despite the fact that assertions on promoting liberalisation have also received 
criticism  (Smallman  &  Sun,  2004),  the  continuous  liberalisation  and  privatisation 
process  undertaken  by  many  countries  signified  their  willingness  to  transfer  the 
investments  in  telecommunications  to  the  private  sector  with  only  few  areas  that 
public investments may have continued to take place such as research/education and 
remote/rural areas (Falch & Henten, 2010).   
Moving forward from the liberlisation stage, Go ́mez-Barroso and Feijo ́o. 
named  the  next  stage  of  telecommunciations  devleopment a n   ‘information  society 
promotion stage’ (J.L. Go ́mez-Barroso & C. Feijo ́o., 2010), in which, many changes 
have  taken  place  –  open  markets,  convergence  of  economic/political  ideologies, 
speeding-up  of  the  technological  advances,  de-centralisation  of  political  decision-
making, economic and geopolitical instability and, especially, a change of economic 
paradigm – from an industrial age to an information age. This change of paradigm 
becomes  the  key  for  the  future  of  the  telecommunications  industry.  Almost  all 
countries  have  their  own  proposals  for  adapting  their  economies  to  the  new 
socioeconomic  realities.  In  these  plans,  ‘universal  access’  to  advanced 
telecommunications services is given a high priority (J.L. Go ́mez-Barroso & C. Feijo 
́o., 2010). Generally speaking, it is assumed that private companies will carry out 
most of the tasks required to reach this objective. In spite of that, the public sector has 
re-appeared, a fact that was unthinkable only ten years earlier.    Researchers (J.L. Go ́mez-Barroso & C. Feijo ́o., 2010) defined the role of the 
public setor in this information promotion stage as “an indirect actor, encouraging 
demand, or backing the activity of the private actors in specific areas and under 
certain conditions. … The current stage provides related extension of roles taken on 
by the public sector, gives more room for establishing new models for the relationship 
between the public and private sectors’.   
The  driving  force  behind  this  re-appearance  of  public  involvement  in 
telecommunications, as identified in a number of literatures, is the economic crisis 
that took hold in a great number of countries during the second half of 2008, which 
has led to the reconsideration of public involvement and a possible better safeguard 
(Cove & Martin, 2010; Falch & Henten, 2010). That also created a need, or room, to 
redefine  the  relationship  between  the  free  operation  of  the  market  and  public 
intervention in economic/commercial activities.  
It becomes clear here – the wave of liberalisation in the 70s-80s established 
the  idea  that  investment  in  telecommunications  infrastructure  should  be  left  as a  
responsibility to commercial operators. As the direct result of this, the market force 
became a primary driver of the industry development. This idea has certainly not been 
abandoned in the current information stage, but the latest developments in putting 
public funds into the extension of broadband infrastructures could well be interpreted 
as a degree of distrust in the ability of market forces to deliver in terms of a universal 
broadband infrastructure and a universal access (Falch & Henten, 2010). This then 
became an interesting situation seeing that the re-appearance of public engagement in 
the telecommunications is turning the other way round. Now, the issue here is using 
public funds in building out the broadband infrastructure in a sector, which, to a large 
extent, has become privatised decades ago (Falch & Henten, 2010).    
Controversial issues have emerged in this new trend – what instrument should 
be utilised in carrying out this undertaking and what the ideal mix of public and 
private  engagement  should  be.  The  answers  to  these  questions  lead  to  a  recent 
phenomenon,  the  forming  of  public-private-partnerships  (PPPs).  In  fact,  PPPs  has 
appeared to be a popular choice for many governments on this mission. 
2.2  The emergence of public private partnerships (PPPs) 
 
Only in the past few years, the economic literature has approached public–
private partnerships (PPPs) using contract theory and firm theory (Bennett & Iossa, 
2006; Guasch, Laffont, & Straund, 2006) viewing them as a way to avoid market and 
public  failures  while  financing  and  operating  public  services.  Crucial  factors  in 
defining  the  success  of  PPPs  have  been  drawn  in  some  recent  studies  (Picot  & 
Wernick, 2007; Ucciarelli, Sadowski, & Achard, 2010). Some key factors include (a) 
properly identify economic and social targets; (b) effectively match the resources and 
competences of the different partners; (c) design a network in line with the area’s 
geographical  constraints;  and  (d)  define  the  expected  demand  and  the  services 
required. However, current studies have not been able to conclude that PPPs is an 
ideal instrument for public engagement in telecommunications. Furthermore, it is also 
worth to note that literatures have shown that PPPs can, sometimes, lead to failures, 
which are partly rooted in the dynamics of its business structure (Ucciarelli, et al., 
2010).   
Technically, the form of PPPs has significant impact on public and private 
funding at different stages of the target project, that makes the choice of technology 
becomes a core matter and conditions the time horizon of the investment (and the alignment of partnerships along this horizon). For example, in building broadband 
infrastructure, a fiber technology solution (e.g. Fiber-to-the-Home) implies a more 
investment-intensive  project  and  has  a  longer  payback  period  compared  to  other 
technological options such as the wireless network. Thus, although both wired and 
wireless technologies are scalable, the fiber network does allow for greater bandwidth 
capacity (OECD, 2008).   
A  number  of  countries  adopted  PPPs  in  building  their  NGNs,  first  and 
foremost, Australia and New Zealand; but it also, for instance, goes for the Obama 
administration  in  the  US  and  a  few  EU  countries  such  as  Sweden  and  Italy. 
Nevertheless, as a newly emerged phenomenon, PPPs in telecommunications is yet to 
be  tested  out  broadly.  Researchers  pointed  out  that  ‘public-private  partnering  in 
telecommunications  confronts  a  number  of  significant  hurdles,  both  generic  and 
domain-  specific.  Economic-legal  challenges  include  conditions  for  direct  public 
intervention,  potential  distortions  of  competition  and  ‘‘crowding-out’’  of  private 
investments. A second group of difficulties are those related to the framework needed 
for these partnerships to thrive’ (J.L. Go ́mez-Barroso & C. Feijo ́o., 2010). 
As  the  most  ambitious  PPP  project  in  building  next  generation  broadband 
infrastructure, the current NBN project in Australia presents a valuable example for 
the world at large. Building on the above assertions, the following parts of this paper 
will examine the NBN project in Australia in detail with an overall aim to highlight 
the various challenges that this particular project encounters.  
3  An introduction to the Australia National Broadband Network project 
 
In March 2007, the Australian Labor Party announced NBN plan to promote 
broadband economy. New investment in broadband was said to be “one of the most 
critical areas of infrastructure” and the Labor Party’s view was that government can 
play  a  role  ‘‘in  delivering  broadband  investments  to  secure  Australia’s  future 
economic prosperity’’ (Conroy, 2007).  
After  several  amendments,  the  current  government  NBN  proposal  was 
formally announced in 2009, which promised a new network to be built in partnership 
with  the  private  sector  and  that  would  be  ‘‘the  single  largest  nation  building 
infrastructure project in Australian history’’ (S Conroy, 2009b). In particular, NBN 
plan would ‘‘invest up to $43 billion over 8 years to build the national broadband 
network’’ and it would support 25,000 jobs every year, on average, over the life of the 
project  and  at  its  peak  would  support  37,000  jobs”  (S  Conroy,  2009a).  The 
Government also claimed that the full benefits in terms of productivity associated 
with the investment would continue to flow for decades beyond the completion of the 
project (S Conroy, 2009b).  
The rollout plan was carried out immediately after the NBN announcement. A 
company titled NBN Co. was formed in April 2009 to carry out this mission. It was 
set to be a Commonwealth wholly-owned company represented by two “Shareholder 
Ministers” – the Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy 
and the Minister of Finance and Deregulation (S Conroy, 2009b).   
A  comprehensive  study  to  determine  the  operating  arrangements,  detailed 
network  design,  ways  to  attract  private  sector  investment  for  rollout  and  ways  to 
provide  procurement  opportunities  for  local  businesses  was  commenced  in  early 
2010. In addition, legislative changes was made from 1 July 2010, that governs the 
NBN Co. and facilitates the rollout of fibre networks, including the requirement of using  Fibre-to-the-Premises  (FTTP)  technology  in  the  deployment.  The  initial 
investment of $4.7 billion was put into places consequently.  
The Australian Labor Government’s election win in 2010 was at least partly 
due to its NBN policy. Labor’s win indicated that the Australian people do understand 
the  importance  of  the  NBN  as  essential  infrastructure  for  a  range  of  social  and 
economic developments. Passing of critical legislation and the release of the NBN Co. 
business plan took place following the election victory in 2010.  
Although there were certainly queries on the budget throughout the whole 
process, it did not deter the majority of the elected parliamentarians from supporting 
the concept. The election and its focus on the NBN offered opportunities to fine-tune 
the plan, and some significant changes to its details have been made in March 2011 
(Australian Fedreal Parliament, 2011). 
  
3.1  Competition and Regulations 
 
As being the incumbent telecom player in Australia, Telstra owns majority of 
the  telecommunications  infrastructure  in  the  country.  Telstra  has  been  receiving 
complaints from its industry rivals and the consumers for lack of accessibility and the 
monopolistic service pricing for years (AAP, 2009a, 2009b).   
As promised by the NBN proposal, the introduction of the NBN is to change 
the current industry landscape for good. While there will be a transition period where 
some of the old will remain, activities will increasingly move to the new environment 
with ‘a level playing field (S Conroy, 2009a)’ for all the telecom players created by 
the government owned whole-sale only company, the NBN Co..  
The ownership issue of the infrastructure by the incumbent player is said to be 
solved and the wholesale price of the NBN Co. will be decided by the regulators with 
an aim to create fair competition to all the industry players. This in itself will see the 
players starting to realign themselves, and in preparation for the new world many will 
start changing their business plans well before that time.    
Nevertheless,  the  Australian  government  has  published  a  far-reaching 
regulatory regime that did not leave any doubt that there is no way back to the old 
days where the incumbent was able to manipulate the regime. That indicates a single 
most important role of the NBN – providing certainty for the industry about future 
directions. In the end the outcome of the new framework will be aligned with the 
goals of the NBN. Surely, there has been problems, and the outcome is not guaranteed 
either, but for the first time individual companies will be far more in charge of their 
own business rather than leaving the final decision-making to the incumbent. It is 
important to note that these changes will take some time to arrive and there will be a 
transition  period  where  all  the  parties  (NBN  Co.  incumbent  and  other  telecom 
companies) will have to cooperate, this will definitely require give and take.  
Moreover, it was also interesting seeing that the incumbent (Telstra) realised 
that change was inevitable soon after the NBN was announced in April 2009 and it 
reacted swiftly. A new management team was appointed, led by the new CEO, David 
Thodey. Telstra immediately declared its support for the NBN plan and its willingness 
to work with the government. The company also put its weight behind the trans-sector 
concept, which will be the conduit to new revenue. Negotiations between Telstra and 
NBN had been tough but a Heads-of-Agreement was signed in June 2010 and support 
for the government’s regulatory reforms followed in October last year (Telstra, 2010). 
 3.2  the Deployment  
 
With such a high-level public investment, political activities will no doubts 
involved in the NBN process. Although there is an extremely business-like approach 
designed into the project with NBN Co., elections, ministers and government policies 
have had a crucial influence on the NBN plan.  
To date, two large-scale projects have been singled out to form a tangible start 
to the rollout before a full national launch. Tasmania became the first state where the 
rollout commenced in 2009. The start of the new regional backbone network and the 
building of five test sites on the mainland consequently started in mid-2010, and will 
increase to over 30 sites during 2011(Stephen Conroy, 2009). 
The government has released a NBN Implementation Study in 2010, prepared 
by  McKinsey  &  Company/KPMG  (DBCDE,  2010).  The  Implementation  Study 
examines the government's coverage, commerciality and competition objectives as 
well as detailed operating arrangements for NBN Co., its ownership and structure, 
ways  to  attract  private  sector  investment  and  longer  term  privatisation.  The 
government  also  released  the  Statement  of  Expectations,  which  comprises  the 
government’s  response  to  the  Implementation  Study,  and  clearly  sets  out  the 
government’s expectations of NBN Co. as the rollout instrument. 
March 2011 saw the passage of the NBN Access Bill and the NBN Companies 
Bill by the Australian Federal Parliament. The passage overcame a few hurdles during 
the parliamentary debates stage. As the result, a number of key amendments were 
accommodated.  A  clear  restriction  was  placed  to  protect  the  NBN’s  competitive 
advantages,  that  is,  protecting  against  ISPs  implementing  their  own  high-speed 
Internet  network  to  undercut  the  NBN  prior  to  the  NBN’s  rollout.  Other  key 
amendments included the removal of NBN Co.’s powers for price discrimination so 
that they can only discriminate against those retail service providers where they are 
not creditworthy. In addition, NBN Co.’s power to enforce the bundling of voice 
services was also removed. 
It is important to note that, at the point of writing this article, the NBN project 
in Australia is still ongoing at its early stage. A massive deployment in mainland is 
yet to commence and many details will need to be refined in the course of expending 
the deployment. Nevertheless, the early experience can be vital to the success of this 
project  and  this  early  stage  also  makes  valuable  reference  for  other  countries  to 
develop their own broadband policy in a similar or difference way. The following 
parts of this article are therefore prepared to highlight the various challenges that the 
Australia’s NBN project has encountered or is currently facing.   
4  The broadband challenges  
 
Establishing  a  monopolistic  national  wide  wholesale  telecommunications 
company as big as NBN Co. in Australia warrants a huge amount of debate and 
investigation. Prima facie, this initiative goes against the well-established competition 
rule  of  market  economy,  which  promotes  rules  to  ensure  enterprises  have  a  fair 
opportunity to compete in the market place and not to have dominating market powers 
(Taylor, 2006). While in Australia, NBN Co. was established to have the legalised 
exclusive market power as a wholesale telecom company. Many issues evolve from 
this special status. This part of the paper will focus on four particular aspects of the 
NBN project and highlight the associated challenges. 4.1  A challenge to increase transparency and balance government Oversight 
 
Having  a  government  owned  enterprise  to  build  the  national  wide  fibre 
networks by using billions of taxpayer money will, no doubt, require an ultimate level 
of transparency in the entire course of the project. On this aspect, the Australia’s NBN 
project has received criticisms for lack of transparency for several times since its 
commencement in 2009.  
The most recent one is being the comment from the CEO of Optus (Australia), 
Mr. O’Sullivan.
1 Mr. O’Sullivan called for the establishment of an independent body 
whose functionality will parallel that of the Reserve Bank of Australia, to provide 
oversight for the NBN.  He also requested that Australians be given full view of the 
deal between NBN Co and the incumbent (Telstra) relating to its structural separation 
and  called  for  a  competitive  tender  process  to  be  held  for  the  operation  and 
management  of  the  NBN.  In  particular,  Mr.  O’Sullivan  described  the  proposed 
independent  body a s   “a  body  that  would  sit  independently  from  government  and 
would be tasked with ensuring that the NBN is run to a well defined set of criteria all 
aimed  at  managing  the  NBN  in  the  best  interests  of  its  customers,  not  of  the 
government  of  the  day,  nor  of  any  political  agenda,  or  indeed  the  NBN  Co’s 
executives. … It could be tendered out on a state or national basis with contracts 
renewed every three, five or seven years, but they would be renewed on the quality of 
service and the efficiency of each of these operators.” ("Optus chief calls for more 
NBN  oversight,"  2011).    His  voice  is  clear  and  strong  here  –  the  NBN  needs a  
separate layer of oversight to ensure the level of transparency it should have, which 
represents a logical concern of the industry and public.  
However, on the other side, the newly established NBN Co. is claiming a need 
to strike a balance between government intervention and letting the NBN Co. make its 
own decisions in order to obtain favorable financial and investment outcomes. The 
NBN Co. chief executive Mr. Quigley recently claimed that the NBN is at risk of 
being “over-scrutinised” (Herrick, 2011).   
These contradicting claims highlight the first challenge here, that is: what the 
right mix of government intervention and pure business decision-making in running 
the publically funded monopoly telecom company should be. The answer is yet to 
reveal  in  Australia  at  this  stage,  and  the  answer  will  definitely  vary  in  different 
jurisdictions depending on the political and social-cultural factors. Nevertheless, the 
federal Communications Minister Stephen Conroy has responded by confirming that 
the NBN project is not burdened by a dysfunctional level of bureaucratic oversight 
("Conroy defends NBN scrutiny: report," 2011). Consequently in March 2011, the 
federal government has agreed to subject the NBN to another layer of scrutiny by a 
joint parliamentary inquiry with a wide variety of memberships drawn from both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate ("Oakeshott to head NBN inquiry," 2011). 
This joint parliamentary committee will be able to hear not only from public servants, 
but also from private sector witnesses to establish the cost effectiveness of the NBN 
rollout.  
 
4.2  A  challenge  to  find  the  right  combination  of  using  fibre  and  wireless 
technologies 
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1	 ﾠOptus	 ﾠis	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠtelecommunications	 ﾠcompany	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs promised by the current NBN plan, 93 per cent of Australian households 
will be connected to the high speed optical fibre networks at the completion of the 
project. The networks will offer a world-class connection speed of up to 1 gigabit per 
second (Gbps) and 100 megabits per second (Mbps) initially after launch. Coming 
alone with these promises is the question of whether such increase in networking 
speeds justifies the AUD$36 billion price tag of the NBN and whether if Australians 
would need the 1Gbps speed for day to day internet usage.  
Strong arguments have been put forward that there exists alternatives to the 
planned  nationwide  fibre  network  such  as  a  comprehensive  wireless  network 
(utilising  the  next  generation  wireless  technologies).
2  Competition  from  such  next 
generation wireless technologies could affect the adoption forecasts of the NBN and 
that "trends towards ‘mobile-centric’ broadband networks could also have significant 
long-term  implications  for  NBN  Co's  fibre  offerings,  to  the  extent  that  some 
consumers  may  be  willing  to  sacrifice  higher-speed  fibre  transmissions  for  the 
convenience  of  mobile  platforms"  ("NBN  at  risk  from  wireless:  report,"  2011). 
However, the NBN business plan assumes that fixed-wireless substitution is virtually 
non-existent, with wireless-only households growing from today’s 13 per cent to only 
16.4 per cent in 2040. Given the plan assumes that this rate will reach 15 per cent by 
2015, the business plan hinges on minimal growth of wireless-only subscribers over 
30 years ("Bringing NBN investment undone," 2011).   
Nevertheless, as it currently stands, the argument should really be about the 
mix of wireless and fibre technologies in the NBN plan, not whether one technology 
is superior to the other. The two technologies will undoubtedly exists in the future as 
complementary offerings ("Bringing NBN investment undone," 2011), that is, having 
a nationwide wireless network included alongside the fibre component of the NBN 
(Australian  Fedreal  Parliament,  2011).  The  argument  therefore  is,  when  the  time 
comes, a fibre network covering 93 per cent of the population may not be justifiable 
due to its high cost in comparison to the NBN’s international peers, especially given 
that  the  FttH  component  of  the  NBN  is  really  only  reaching  cities  and  certain 
metropolitan areas and not the entire country. 
Examples  were  added  into  this  argument,  including  other  countries  which 
have plans on introducing high speed broadband networks such as the United States 
and  India  have  been  encouraging  a  national  wireless  broadband  rollout.  The U S  
president  Barack  Obama  announced  a  US$11  billion  government  funded  national 
wireless broadband public safety network and India is aiming to facilitate a variety of 
technologies such as FttH, FttC and wireless technologies such as CDMA EV-DO, 
WiMAX, HSPA and 4G LTE (Australian Fedreal Parliament, 2011).  
The current situation in Australia is – altering the technology mix between 
fibre and wireless could jeopardise the government’s claim that the project should 
remain off budget as a commercial investment. This could also deliver an unfavorable 
political image for the government even if a better technical outcome can be achieved. 
Because after all, the NBN represents not only a pure business decision but also, more 
importantly, a political agenda. Such political issues are discussed in more depth in 
section 4.3.  
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2	 ﾠ	 ﾠE x a m p l e s 	 ﾠo f 	 ﾠs u c h 	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 ﾠ4 G 	 ﾠL o n g 	 ﾠT e r m 	 ﾠE v o l u t i o n 	 ﾠ( L T E ) 	 ﾠn e t w o r k i n g 	 ﾠe m p l o y e d 	 ﾠb y 	 ﾠ
telecommunications	 ﾠ companies	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ Verizon	 ﾠ Wireless	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ US,	 ﾠ Worldwide	 ﾠ Interoperability	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
Microwave	 ﾠAccess	 ﾠ(WiMAX)	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠby	 ﾠcompanies	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠSprint	 ﾠNextel	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS,	 ﾠand	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠSpeed	 ﾠPacket	 ﾠ
Access	 ﾠ(HSPA/HSPA+)	 ﾠnetworking	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠby	 ﾠcompanies	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠTelstra	 ﾠ(HSPA+)	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠAT&T	 ﾠ
(HSDPA/HSUPA)	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠAs the result, the question of whether the 93 per cent national fibre coverage is 
a right choice representing a true need of Australian public and economy, or it is just 
an expensive tool facilitating the political party to win the election remained to be 
tested in the coming decade. Unfortunately, the price will be too high to bear for the 
nation if it is proved to be a mistake by then. That brings out the second challenge in 
policymaking,  what  is  the  right  combination  in  using  fibre  technology  and  other 
alternatives? Although this challenge is definitely another issue subject to various 
factors such as the size of population and geographical condition of the country, a 
common principle can probably be drawn here, that is: the calculation of the mix 
needs to be carefully conducted before the decision is made, and the decision should 
primarily serve the true needs of the economy rather than becoming a pretty tool for 
any other purposes.  
 
4.3  A challenge to ensure the objectives are clear and feasible  
 
As indicated above, using such an amount of public funds will guarantee the 
political characteristic of the project. The NBN policy in Australia is now serving 
several political agendas. Apart from subsidising regional broadband, two other major 
agendas are to reconstruct the incumbent telecom player, Telstra (Kohler, 2011) and 
to  utilise  the  yet-to-build  fibre  network  as  a  national  infrastructure  for  the  digital 
economy with social and economic benefits in areas such as e-health, smart grids, e-
government,  education  and  e-commerce  (Budde,  2010;  Gillard,  Smith,  &  Conroy, 
2011).   
The issue of the reconstruction of Telstra can be achieved through a process of 
structural separation called for by the NBN legislation. As Telstra holds a dominant 
position on the telecommunications market, the sooner the structural separation takes 
place the more competitive the telecommunications sector will be in the post-NBN 
market (The Allen Consulting Group, 2006). The structural separation of Telstra will 
involve progressive decommissioning and deactivation of Telstra’s copper and HFC 
networks as the FTTP network is rolled out, utilisation of existing Telstra exchange 
space, utilisation of a significant volume of Telstra’s existing ducts and conduits and 
access to dark fibre and managed services for backhaul. Many of these activities have 
started in recent negotiations between Telstra and NBN Co.. 
In comparison, the issue of viewing the NBN as a national infrastructure for 
the digital economy requires a more in depth discussion. 
The Australian government has shown its intention for the NBN to be viewed 
as a national utility, although some argued that it is more of a project built primarily 
to  gain  financial  returns  on  investments.  Budde’s  recent  article s t a n ds  out  in  this 
discussion (Budde, 2011). He proposed that, in reality, the true intentions for the NBN 
are a balance of the two such that the NBN would be a utility that delivered a return 
of sorts on investment to the government. Nonetheless, the interests of NBN Co. and 
that of the federal government are somewhat misaligned. NBN Co.’s main agenda is 
to create the returns on investments as being a real business in the market place, 
whereas the government wants the NBN for its social and economic benefits that can 
be ignored by NBN Co.’s business model. Through NBN Co.’s process of building 
such high-speed communications network, a vital part of the government’s agenda 
can be lost, as it does not pay priority attention to the social and economic benefits 
that the NBN can bring simply because it is not in the interest of NBN Co. financially.  On this point, the Australian government should have make it clear on how the 
business objective of NBN Co. can align with the NBN’s social objectives before the 
commencement of the rollout. Although the government reiterated that the NBN is a 
nation  building  exercise,  it  could  have  highlighted  such  an  agenda  even  more  by 
offering  evidence  of  the  aforementioned  social  and  economic  benefits  such  as 
healthcare and education. 
It was good to see that the Australian government has installed new policies to 
address  the  under-representation  of  the  social  and  economic  benefits  in  the 
formulating of the design and regulation of the NBN recently. One of such policies is 
the  assignment  of  the  portfolio  of  ‘Digital  Productivity’  to  the  Minister  for 
Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy Stephen Conroy. With this 
portfolio,  the  minister  can  direct  other  government  departments  and  organisations 
towards the NBN, which can be seen as a means to ensure that the NBN will be used 
to achieve broader social and economic benefits (Gillard, et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
the Labor government has also promised flat or declining retail prices for the NBN. 
To certain extent, these measures do represent the government’s willingness to make 
the NBN a utility so it serves the public as its primary goal. However, making the 
policy is one thing but carrying it out can be another thing. The feasibility and the 
possible  complications  in  carrying  out  these  measures  are  yet  to  be  tested.  For 
example, despite the fact that the government has promised a flat retail price, the ISPs 
connecting with NBN will surely want to pass their wholesale price to the end-users 
to achieve their commercial benefit. How the government keeps the control of this 
and creates a sound market place for commercial activities at the same time is another 
challenge yet to come.  
Thus, a question stems from these debate on political agendas becomes clear 
here – what the primary objective of the NBN project is. If it primarily aims to serve 
the public as a utility, a challenge that the Australian government currently facing is: 
how  to  balance  the  business  objective  to  maximise  returns  and  the  government’s 
political agenda to benefit the general public at the same time. To answer this, the 
government needs to come up with a sound justification for such a significant public 
spending in a business-like activity with a much detailed action plan and this plan 
needs to come early enough to avoid controversies and confusions from the industry 
and the public. Mere promises without implementation measures will not work. On 
the other hand, if NBN aims to bring return on investment of government by serving 
the  country  as  a  utility  (just  as  Budde  proposed),  the  challenge  here  would  be: 
examine if these multi objectives could possibly be achieved in one undertaking; and 
if so, what the appropriate implementation measures are. Again, the studies on these 
issues should have been done before the commencement of the project. Unfortunately, 
Australia presented a failed example on this. 
 
4.4  A challenge to set the right pricing model 
 
Pricing  model  is  another  vital  part  of  discussion.  Some  Internet  service 
providers  (ISPs)  have  raised  concerns  about  the  NBN’s  usage-based  wholesale 
pricing model as outlined in the NBN business plan. The concerns come after the 
ISPs’ research showed that the ISPs would be held accountable for paying for the 
extra data traffic that consumers will generate (Harris, 2011a). In addition, the NBN 
estimates that 36 per cent of the network’s revenue would come from the usage-based 
Connectivity  Virtual  Circuit  (CVC)  by  the  year  2040.  Without  such  usage  based wholesale  pricing  model,  the  NBN  would  unlikely  to  generate  adequate  revenue 
required to keep it off budget (Harris, 2011b).  
With  the  increased  media  consumption  on  the  Internet  and  the  dramatic 
increase in data usage in the current online culture, the ISPs will be looking at passing 
costs  of  the  usage-based  CVC  to  the  consumers  because  there  is  virtually  zero 
revenue that can be extracted from online media outlets such as YouTube. The cost to 
consumers  will  further  increase  due  to  the  increase  in  demand  for  online  media 
because it will force many end users to adopt the expensive 250GB/month plan as 
opposed to the 50GB/month plan that the government has used to calculate the NBN’s 
competitive pricing model. (Harris, 2011a) 
The explosion in data traffic due to online media consumption has already 
been felt by ISPs in the United States due to inexpensive online media streaming 
solutions such as Netflix and Hulu which offer tens of millions of users the ability to 
stream  an  unlimited  amount  of  high  definition  movies  and  TV  shows  to  their 
computers  and  other  multimedia  devices  such  as  iPhones  and  iPads.  With  this  in 
mind, video streaming will undoubtedly be a driving force behind increasing Internet 
traffic in the near and distant future. Because the ISPs are unable to force the content 
providers to pay for the large capacity of data that they are using to transfer the digital 
content, the consumers will be dealt the cost of the traffic if the government is to 
maintain the usage-based CVC pricing model (Harris, 2011a). This then raises the 
question of whether the government should subsidise the NBN to households at the 
expense of billions of dollars of taxpayer funding.  
Those who believe that the NBN will propel Australia’s digital economy in 
the post-NBN era are able to justify the taxpayer funding for the project. However, 
those  who  believe  that  the  NBN  will  predominantly  be  used  for  online  media 
consumption fail to see a justification for the taxpayer funding for a project, which the 
government is emphasising as a commercial investment whose viability is based on 
usage-based revenue. This is because if the content providers such as YouTube are 
not charged for their high volume of Internet traffic, the cost will undoubtedly fall on 
consumers, which will result in a dramatic reduction in data usage. (Harris, 2011a) 
The  Australian  government’s  usage-based  wholesale  pricing  model  is  thus 
fragile and it is hard to strike a balance between profitability and consumer benefit. If 
the government were to maintain such a model, then the benefit to consumers of such 
a high-speed broadband infrastructure will diminish and ultimately lead to a reduction 
in revenue and return on investment that NBN Co. is hoping for. So the challenge 
here is for the Australian government to work out an alternative or a replacement 
pricing model, which can only be done after the NBN objective is made clearer (re 
challenge 4.3 above).  
Moreover, an associated challenge relating to the pricing model appeared on 
deciding Points of Interconnect (POIs). Decision on POIs is important because the 
location and number of POIs will affect a number of markets, including markets for 
transmission services and downstream markets at both retail and wholesale level. The 
POIs-related decision-making in Australia is not yet concluded at the time of writing 
this article. The process however provides valuable experience.  
In  October  2010,  NBN  Co.  proposed  14  POIs  to  the  national  competition 
watchdog, the Australia Competition Consumer Commission (ACCC) (ACCC, 2010). 
Two month later, NBN Co. proposed to ACCC again on the same matter, but this 
time, a 120 POIs plan was proposed, which was shortly increased to 121 POIs in total 
(ACCC, 2011). Dramatically increasing the number of POIs by NBN Co. came with 
two main concerns. Firstly, the price for interconnecting NBN’s 121 POIs would be prohibitively expensive for retail ISPs. Only few bigger companies could possibly 
able to connect to all the POIs if this plan goes ahead. This situation will not warrant a 
full competition at the retail level as the NBN project originally promised. Secondly, 
POIs is an issue relating to the building of network protection. Many operators in 
Australia are currently providing Internet services without protection in any part of 
the access network, but most Telstra PSTN voice services are built with significant 
protection within the network. By moving to a large number of POIs the opportunity 
to build effective protection will likely to be lost due to the financial restraints of the 
companies. In the event of significant natural or unnatural disasters, there would be a 
potential of hundreds of thousands of network users would be left without any fixed 
line service at all. After mobile operators shift their backhaul traffic to the NBN, 
mobile services are likely to be disabled as well in the situation like this. In addition, 
the sharp increase in proposing the numbers of POIs (from 14 to 121 in 2 months) 
also indicated that NBN’s original proposal was done with a lower level of care and 
diligence.  
Nonetheless, appropriate pricing model is a key to gain the projected result. 
Although this issue might look more like a commercial decision depending on the 
judgments of economists, it is in fact a challenge for the policy makers to set the right 
benchmark  between  promoting  business  and  maintaining  an  appropriate  level  of 
competition in the industry. The NBN’s response to this challenge is yet to come. 
5  Conclusion  
 
Telecommunications  companies,  governments  and  regulators  around  the 
world are grappling with the challenges of investing in the next generation access 
networks. Convinced about the scale of their economic and social benefits, frustrated 
by  the  pace  of  investment  under  existing  regulatory  structures,  attracted  by  the 
apparent progress made in places like Korea and Japan where industrial policy has 
been vigorously pursued, some governments have contemplated sharp changes to the 
policies of the last two decades (Given, 2011).  
The plan promoted by the Australian government to use PPP to invest in fibre 
access networks reaching 93 per cent Australian by 2020 has a far-reaching impact on 
the country’s long-term development. Moreover, it reflects the current enthusiasm for 
public spending on infrastructure in response to the global economic downturn. It also 
brings back an old notion of public investment in telecommunications although the 
investment model now (through PPPs) is different.  
The NBN project in Australia has battled through a long way to reach its 
current status where most people seem to agree that Australia has the right vision for 
their national broadband plans based on FttH, the social and economic benefits linked 
to a trans-sector approach and the structural separation of the incumbent. However, 
the NBN project is still an ongoing concern attracting media debates on a daily basis. 
Academics,  politicians,  industry  stakeholders,  regulators  and  other  experts  are  all 
claiming  that  different  things  need  to  be  done  to  make  NBN  work  better.  The 
proposed  variations  are  all  different  from  each  other,  as  most  of  the  individual 
alternatives  are  based  on  diverse  fields  of  expertise,  personal  views  and  vested 
interests.  So,  there  is  no,  or  very  little,  uniformity  in  these  comments.  The  only 
possible agreement in these comments seems to be that there are changes need to be 
made to the NBN plan. The choice for the Australian government is limited here – the 
government can choose to stop and re-think the plan with a view to make it a closer-to-perfect plan. However, that is probably never going to happen but will most likely 
result in significant delays. Alternatively, the government can choose to continue with 
the original plan and make changes as the project progresses with a view that there is 
never going to be a ‘perfect’ plan. Apparently the second option was chosen and this 
choice  was  inevitably  made  with  prices  –  the  ongoing  changes,  corrections  and 
discussions have offered chances to declare the evidence that the whole project is 
flawed. Unfortunately, this is the price that the Australian government needs to pay.  
By now, this paper critically analysed the NBN project in Australia against 
recent literatures on utilising public spending in broadband infrastructure. This paper 
also  highlighted  four  challenges  that  the  current  NBN  deployment  in  Australia  is 
facing. Although the success or failure of this project will eventually be judged by 
international  comparisons  of  the  availability,  speed  and  price  of  services,  it  is 
important  to  carefully  evaluate  every  step  of  such  a  significant  project  so  the 
experience can be shared and lessons can be learned.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 References 
 
AAP.	 ﾠ(2009a,	 ﾠ23	 ﾠOct).	 ﾠTelcos	 ﾠurge	 ﾠTelstra	 ﾠbreak-ﾭ‐up.	 ﾠHerald	 ﾠSun.	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/business/telcos-ﾭ‐urge-ﾭ‐telstra-ﾭ‐break-ﾭ‐up/story-ﾭ‐
e6frfh4f-ﾭ‐1225790322564	 ﾠ
AAP.	 ﾠ(2009b,	 ﾠ23	 ﾠOct.).	 ﾠTelstra	 ﾠrecords	 ﾠhighest	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠirate	 ﾠcustomers	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
complaints	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtelecommunications	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠsoar.	 ﾠHerald	 ﾠSun.	 ﾠ
Retrieved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠhttp://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/telstra-ﾭ‐records-ﾭ‐highest-ﾭ‐
number-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐irate-ﾭ‐customers-ﾭ‐as-ﾭ‐complaints-ﾭ‐against-ﾭ‐the-ﾭ‐telecommunications-ﾭ‐
industry-ﾭ‐soar/story-ﾭ‐e6frf7jo-ﾭ‐1225790407922	 ﾠ
ACCC.	 ﾠ(2010).	 ﾠAn	 ﾠACCC	 ﾠDiscussion	 ﾠPaper	 ﾠon	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterconnect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNational	 ﾠ
Broadband	 ﾠNetwork.	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/952292.	 ﾠ
ACCC.	 ﾠ(2011).	 ﾠNBN	 ﾠPoints	 ﾠof	 ﾠInterconnect.	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/952292.	 ﾠ
Australian	 ﾠFedreal	 ﾠParliament.	 ﾠ(2011).	 ﾠJournals	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSenate	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/journals/20110324_
SJ027/toc_pdf/jnlp_027.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22nationa
l%20broadband%20network%22.	 ﾠ
Bennett,	 ﾠJ.,	 ﾠ&	 ﾠIossa,	 ﾠE.	 ﾠ(2006).	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontracting	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠservices.	 ﾠReview	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndustrial	 ﾠOrganization,	 ﾠ29(1/2),	 ﾠ75–92.	 ﾠ
Bringing	 ﾠNBN	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠundone.	 ﾠ(2011).	 ﾠBusiness	 ﾠSpectator.	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/NBN-ﾭ‐Co-ﾭ‐business-ﾭ‐case-ﾭ‐
wireless-ﾭ‐Gillard-ﾭ‐Yasi-ﾭ‐pd20110204-ﾭ‐DQVU4?OpenDocument&src=srch	 ﾠ
Budde,	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ(2010).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠNBN's	 ﾠwires	 ﾠare	 ﾠcrossed	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠ12	 ﾠApril,	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/NBN-ﾭ‐Co-ﾭ‐Stephen-ﾭ‐
Conroy-ﾭ‐broadband-ﾭ‐pd20110325-ﾭ‐FAA4E?opendocument&src=rss	 ﾠ
Budde,	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ(2011).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠNBN's	 ﾠwires	 ﾠare	 ﾠcrossed.	 ﾠBusiness	 ﾠSpectator.	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/NBN-ﾭ‐Co-ﾭ‐Stephen-ﾭ‐
Conroy-ﾭ‐broadband-ﾭ‐pd20110325-ﾭ‐FAA4E?opendocument&src=rss	 ﾠ
Conroy	 ﾠdefends	 ﾠNBN	 ﾠscrutiny:	 ﾠreport.	 ﾠ(2011).	 ﾠBusiness	 ﾠSpectator.	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Conroy-ﾭ‐defends-ﾭ‐NBN-ﾭ‐
scrutiny-ﾭ‐report-ﾭ‐pd20110223-ﾭ‐ECR6M?opendocument&src=rss	 ﾠ
Conroy,	 ﾠS.	 ﾠ(2007).	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠLabor	 ﾠParty	 ﾠ(ALP)	 ﾠNBN	 ﾠAnnouncement.	 ﾠ
Conroy,	 ﾠS.	 ﾠ(2009a).	 ﾠHistoric	 ﾠreforms	 ﾠto	 ﾠtelecommunications	 ﾠregulation.	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ
<http://www.minister.dbcde.gov.au/media/media_releases/2009/088>.	 ﾠ
Conroy,	 ﾠS.	 ﾠ(2009b).	 ﾠNew	 ﾠNational	 ﾠBroadband	 ﾠNetwork.	 ﾠMinister	 ﾠfor	 ﾠBroadband,	 ﾠ
Communications	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDigital	 ﾠEconomy.	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.minister.dbcde.gov.au/media/media_releases/2009/022	 ﾠ
Conroy,	 ﾠS.	 ﾠ(Producer).	 ﾠ(2009,	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ8)	 ﾠTasmania	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠto	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠsuperfast	 ﾠbroadband.	 ﾠ
Minister	 ﾠfor	 ﾠBroadband,	 ﾠCommunications	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDigital	 ﾠEconomy	 ﾠDeputy	 ﾠ
Leader	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGovernment	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSenate.	 ﾠretrieved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.minister.dbcde.gov.au/media/media_releases/2009/023	 ﾠCove,	 ﾠM.,	 ﾠ&	 ﾠMartin,	 ﾠI.	 ﾠ(2010).	 ﾠMotives	 ﾠand	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
nationwide	 ﾠnext	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠnetworks.	 ﾠTelecommunications	 ﾠPolicy,	 ﾠ34(505-ﾭ‐
512).	 ﾠ
DBCDE.	 ﾠ(2010).	 ﾠNational	 ﾠBroadband	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠImplementation	 ﾠStudy.	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.dbcde.gov.au/broadband/national_broadband_network/nationa
l_broadband_network_implementation_study.	 ﾠ
Falch,	 ﾠM.,	 ﾠ&	 ﾠHenten,	 ﾠA.	 ﾠ(2010).	 ﾠPublic	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠpartnerships	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠtool	 ﾠfor	 ﾠstimulating	 ﾠ
investments	 ﾠin	 ﾠbroadband.	 ﾠTelecommunications	 ﾠPolicy,	 ﾠ34,	 ﾠ496–504.	 ﾠ
Feijo	 ﾠ́o.,	 ﾠC.	 ﾠG.	 ﾠm.-ﾭ‐B.,	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠL.,	 ﾠ&	 ﾠRojo	 ﾠAlonso,	 ﾠD.,.	 ﾠ(2006).	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
electronic	 ﾠcommunications	 ﾠsector:	 ﾠEvolution	 ﾠand	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠanalysis.	 ﾠAnnals	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Telecommunications,	 ﾠ61(7/8),	 ﾠ842-ﾭ‐859.	 ﾠ
Gillard,	 ﾠJ.,	 ﾠSmith,	 ﾠS.,	 ﾠ&	 ﾠConroy,	 ﾠS.	 ﾠ(2011).	 ﾠStrengthening	 ﾠAustralia's	 ﾠDigital	 ﾠFuture.	 ﾠ
Retrieved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.minister.dbcde.gov.au/media/media_releases/2011/151.	 ﾠ
Given,	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠ(2011).	 ﾠTake	 ﾠyour	 ﾠpartners:	 ﾠPublic	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠinterplay	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠNew	 ﾠ
Zealand	 ﾠplans	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnext	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠbroadband.	 ﾠTelecommunications	 ﾠPolicy,	 ﾠ23,	 ﾠ
540-ﾭ‐549.	 ﾠ
Guasch,	 ﾠL.,	 ﾠLaffont,	 ﾠJ.,	 ﾠ&	 ﾠStraund,	 ﾠS.	 ﾠ(2006).	 ﾠRenegotiation	 ﾠof	 ﾠconcession	 ﾠcontracts:	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
theoretical	 ﾠapproach.	 ﾠReview	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndustrial	 ﾠOrganization,	 ﾠ29(1/2),	 ﾠ55-ﾭ‐73.	 ﾠ
Harris,	 ﾠA.	 ﾠ(2011a).	 ﾠApproaching	 ﾠNBN	 ﾠbreaking	 ﾠpoint.	 ﾠBusiness	 ﾠSpectator.	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠhttp://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Optus-ﾭ‐Internode-ﾭ‐
NBN-ﾭ‐Gillard-ﾭ‐Conroy-ﾭ‐pd20110323-ﾭ‐F877H?opendocument	 ﾠ
Harris,	 ﾠA.	 ﾠ(2011b).	 ﾠBringing	 ﾠNBN	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠundone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠ13	 ﾠApril,	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/NBN-ﾭ‐Co-ﾭ‐business-ﾭ‐case-ﾭ‐
wireless-ﾭ‐Gillard-ﾭ‐Yasi-ﾭ‐pd20110204-ﾭ‐DQVU4?OpenDocument&src=srch	 ﾠ
Herrick,	 ﾠC.	 ﾠ(2011).	 ﾠNBN	 ﾠCo's	 ﾠQuigley	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠoversight	 ﾠmethods.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Retrieved	 ﾠ2	 ﾠApril,	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.cio.com.au/article/380829/nbn_co_quigley_questions_governm
ent_oversight_methods/	 ﾠ
J.L.	 ﾠGo	 ﾠ́mez-ﾭ‐Barroso	 ﾠ&	 ﾠC.	 ﾠFeijo	 ﾠ́o.	 ﾠ(2010).	 ﾠA	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠframework	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic-ﾭ‐private	 ﾠ
interplay	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtelecommunications	 ﾠsector.	 ﾠTelecommunications	 ﾠPolicy,	 ﾠ34,	 ﾠ
487-ﾭ‐495.	 ﾠ
Kohler,	 ﾠA.	 ﾠ(2011).	 ﾠAutomatons	 ﾠno	 ﾠmore.	 ﾠBusiness	 ﾠSpectator.	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Julia-ﾭ‐Gillard-ﾭ‐Labor-ﾭ‐
carbon-ﾭ‐NBN-ﾭ‐broadband-ﾭ‐politics-ﾭ‐pd20110228-ﾭ‐EGRR3?opendocument&src=rss	 ﾠ
NBN	 ﾠat	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwireless:	 ﾠreport.	 ﾠ(2011).	 ﾠBusiness	 ﾠSpectator.	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/NBN-ﾭ‐corporate-ﾭ‐plan-ﾭ‐is-ﾭ‐
reasonable-ﾭ‐report-ﾭ‐pd20110214-ﾭ‐E36HC?opendocument&src=rss	 ﾠ
Oakeshott	 ﾠto	 ﾠhead	 ﾠNBN	 ﾠinquiry.	 ﾠ(2011).	 ﾠBusiness	 ﾠSpectator.	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Oakeshott-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐head-ﾭ‐
NBN-ﾭ‐inquiry-ﾭ‐EJDVC?OpenDocument&emcontent_nbn	 ﾠ
OECD.	 ﾠ(2008).	 ﾠDevelopments	 ﾠin	 ﾠfiber	 ﾠtechnologies	 ﾠand	 ﾠinvestment.	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠparty	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Communication	 ﾠInfrastructures	 ﾠand	 ﾠServices	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠ	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠ13	 ﾠApril,	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/8/40390735.pdfS.	 ﾠ
OECD.	 ﾠ(2010).	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠBroadband	 ﾠstatistics.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠ12	 ﾠApril,	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,3746,en_2649_33703_38690102_1_1
_1_1,00.html#Penetration	 ﾠOptus	 ﾠchief	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠNBN	 ﾠoversight.	 ﾠ(2011).	 ﾠBusiness	 ﾠSpectator.	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Optus-ﾭ‐chief-ﾭ‐wants-ﾭ‐
more-ﾭ‐NBN-ﾭ‐oversight-ﾭ‐pd20110227-ﾭ‐EG7NB?opendocument&src=rss	 ﾠ
Picot,	 ﾠA.,	 ﾠ&	 ﾠWernick,	 ﾠC.	 ﾠ(2007).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠin	 ﾠbroadband	 ﾠaccess.	 ﾠ
Telecommunications	 ﾠPolicy,	 ﾠ31(10/11),	 ﾠ660–674.	 ﾠ
Smallman,	 ﾠC.,	 ﾠ&	 ﾠSun,	 ﾠX.	 ﾠ(2004).	 ﾠReframing	 ﾠprivatisation:	 ﾠDeconstructing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmyth	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
efficiency.	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠSciences,	 ﾠ37(2),	 ﾠ159-ﾭ‐183.	 ﾠ
Taylor,	 ﾠM.	 ﾠ(2006).	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠlaw:	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTO?	 ﾠ
Cambridge:	 ﾠCambridge	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠPress.	 ﾠ
Telstra.	 ﾠ(2010,	 ﾠ20	 ﾠJune).	 ﾠTelstra	 ﾠsigns	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠHeads	 ﾠof	 ﾠAgreement	 ﾠon	 ﾠNBN.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Retrieved	 ﾠ1	 ﾠSept.,	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.telstra.com.au/abouttelstra/media-ﾭ‐
centre/announcements/telstra-ﾭ‐signs-ﾭ‐financial-ﾭ‐heads-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐agreement-ﾭ‐on-ﾭ‐nbn-ﾭ‐
1.xml	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠAllen	 ﾠConsulting	 ﾠGroup.	 ﾠ(2006).	 ﾠStructural	 ﾠseparation	 ﾠof	 ﾠTelstra	 ﾠ—	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
needed,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠ5	 ﾠMay,	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://www.dbcde.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/71757/5._CCC_Allen
_report_270607.pdf	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠHouse.	 ﾠ(2011).	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠObama	 ﾠDetails	 ﾠPlan	 ﾠto	 ﾠWin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFuture	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
Expanded	 ﾠWireless	 ﾠAccess,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠHouse	 ﾠNews	 ﾠRelease.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Ucciarelli,	 ﾠA.,	 ﾠSadowski,	 ﾠB.	 ﾠM.,	 ﾠ&	 ﾠAchard,	 ﾠP.	 ﾠO.	 ﾠ(2010).	 ﾠEmerging	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic–
private	 ﾠinterplay	 ﾠfor	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠbroadband	 ﾠaccess:	 ﾠEvidence	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Netherlands	 ﾠand	 ﾠItaly.	 ﾠTelecommunications	 ﾠPolicy,	 ﾠ34(	 ﾠ),	 ﾠ513-ﾭ‐527.	 ﾠ
Yu	 ﾠLiangchuan,	 ﾠS.	 ﾠB.,	 ﾠQing	 ﾠGuo.	 ﾠ(2004).	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠof	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠ
Telecommunications:	 ﾠnew	 ﾠregulatory	 ﾠpolicies.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠRetrieved	 ﾠ24	 ﾠJune,	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/centers/purc/primary/documents/market_perf_000.
pdf	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
 